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Thank you very much, Dorian and Theresa for those really kind words
of welcome, and thank you to all of you and to the administration of the
university for inviting me here. So in the United Kingdom where I live
and where I work, the National Health Service or NHS is the primary
provider of preventative and therapeutic healthcare for 65 million
citizens. NHS care is free at the point of need. it’s not means tested. It’s
funded by taxes and central government.
The NHS provides general practitioners, specialist consultants,
hospital doctors, surgeons and nurses, community nurses, midwives,
pharmacists, paramedics, counselors, mental health services,
contraception and sexual health services all free at the point of delivery.
Across the UK it includes free medication on prescription for under
18’s, over 60’s, pregnant women and new mothers, some people with
disabilities, and people in receipt of social security benefits. All UK
residents are eligible for NHS services.
A leaflet distributed shortly prior to the launch of NHS in 1948 spells
out its vision, deeply rooted in the notion of a common good. It will
provide you with all medical, dental, and nursing care. Everyone rich
or poor, man, woman, or child can use it or any part of it. But it’s not
a charity. You’re paying for it mainly as taxpayers and it will relieve
your money worries in times of illness. I’d like to play you a short audio
recording of Aneurin Bevan, the architect of the NHS speaking, and this
is taken from an exhibit at the People’s History Museum in Manchester.
[Recording Plays]
Aneurin: I’m proud about the National Health Service. It’s a piece of
real socialism. It’s a piece of real Christianity too you know. We had

to wait a long time for it. What I had in mind when we organized the
National Health Service in 1948 to 1958, and remember when we did
it, you younger ones, this is immediately after the end of World War II
when we were, as Sir Winston Churchill then said, a bankrupt nation.
But nevertheless we did these things, and there is nowhere in any nation
in the world, communist or capitalist, any health service to compare
with it. Now the National Health Service had two pain principles
underlining it. One, that the medical arts of science and healing should
be made available to people when they needed them, irrespective of
whether they could afford to pay for them or not.
That was the first principle. The second was that this should be done
not at the expense of the poorer members of the community but of the
well to do. In short, I refuse to accept the insurance principle. I refuse
to accept the principle that the National Health Service should be paid
by contributions. I refuse to accept that. I refused to accept it because I
thought it was nonsense. If you hadn’t fully paid up. you couldn’t have
a second class operation because your card wasn’t full of stamps, could
you?
Susanna: So that I think is a really powerful vision of the common
good, not an uncontested one, not an unproblematic one, but a powerful
one nonetheless, based in the conviction that healthcare shouldn’t be
a privilege of the deserving or the rich. From its inception though it’s
faced challenges. The population continues to grow, and under our
current government the NHS’s budget continues to shrink. Nonetheless,
within its remit is written into law and into the NHS’s own contract
of care that the provider must take account of the spiritual, religious,
pastoral, and cultural needs of all service users.
So commissioning groups have had difficult decisions to make about
the prioritization of funds and about how to balance the good and
the needs of individual patients with those of society as a whole. Is
care for everyone simply too costly? How should different aspects of
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healthcare be prioritized? And in this lecture I’ll be considering the
place of spiritual care, itself increasingly marginalized in the NHS
particularly for transgender people who might also be considered a
niche or a marginal group, and I’ll point to the necessity of affirming
and compassionate theologies around transgender and also the emerging
work of transgender Christians and their allies.
And then later in the lecture I move to considering how goods play
out and how understandings of the common good play out in another
area of gender medicine, that involving the decisions made around
intersex children and their healthcare. And if terms like “intersex” and
“transgender” are not familiar to you, please don’t worry, we’re going to
unpack them as we go along.
So first of all, what is transgender? It’s a term some of you will be very
familiar with, others less so perhaps. Transgender people experience a
disjunction of some kind between their physical sex and their gender
identity, that is their sense of being a man or a woman. Some seek
hormone therapy or various physical surgeries in order to bring their
bodies more into line with their identity.
Others however either because of choice or because of lack of access
to funding for medical interventions may live in their preferred gender
without ever going through any physical alterations. In the UK the
average age for beginning gender transition is 42, and I think this is
significant as by their 40s most people are well-established in their adult
lives, they may well have spouses, children, and visible public roles in
their communities. Transition is usually something they have considered
long and hard.
So weighing out goods in this context also means awareness of the
possible challenges posed to others who felt invested in the lives and
relationships with people who transition, and this is where I think
some of the recent evangelical commentators on transgender, people
like Mark Yarhouse, Vaughan Roberts, and Andrew Walker are clearly
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motivated by compassion and concern for families and relations, but
where I suspect they get the balance slightly wrong, because I think
they’re too unreflective about the harm that a narrow binary gender
system does to all of us, not just to trans people.
Theological responses to transgender, and I’m thinking of those
particularly that have emerged since the last years of the 20th
century, have sometimes focused on Biblical texts such as those from
Deuteronomy and Leviticus which outlaw for example women wearing
men’s apparel, offering animals with bruised or crushed testes as
sacrifices, or admitting to the assembly of the Lord someone whose
penis has been cut off. And I’ve discussed in more length elsewhere the
fact that such texts appear to be as much about issues like disability and
concerns about preserving the community by ensuring the continued
possibility of procreation as well as in terms of markers of inclusion
such as male circumcision as they are about sex per se.
Furthermore, there is a counter stream within the Biblical texts
themselves which point to a community in which those with torn,
crushed, or excised genitals – notably eunuchs – are not excluded but
included as full members. We might point here to narratives such as
Acts 8, the story of the Ethiopian eunuch baptized with no mention
of his physical difference, or Jesus’s words about eunuchs from birth,
those made eunuchs by others and those who made themselves eunuchs
for the sake of the Kingdom in Matthew 19, which some interpreters
understand as including present day intersex and transgender people.
And Isaiah 56, an example of a Biblical pun where we’re told eunuchs
will be given a name better than sons and daughters, an everlasting
name which will not be cut off. Let the reader understand.
Now those who’ve had theological reservations about transgender have
often started from the conviction that human bodies and identities,
but especially bodies, have a certain givenness, an irreducibility, a
directedness as created by God, and that therefore there are certain
things and only certain things that it’s legitimate to do to and be in them.
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So for example, Oliver O’Donovan the British evangelical ethicist holds
to know oneself as body is to know that there are only certain things
that one can do and be, because one’s freedom must be responsible to
a given form which is the form of one’s own experience in the material
world.
Beyond this, there are also concerns about whether gender transition
tends to lead to or perhaps to mask same-sex relationships as well as
the pastoral anxieties we’ve already mentioned about the effects of
transition on family members of the transitioning person. O’Donovan
though is particularly concerned about issues of illusion versus reality
and the extent to which surgically created genitals may be understood
as veritably human. Interestingly though, O’Donovan in common with
some other theological interpreters outlaws medical interventions for
transgender people but has no problem with them for intersex people,
those who have an unusual physical sex.
The argument here is that where physical sex is atypical it is appropriate
to clarify it, but that this is not true for gender identity. So physical sex
is understood as the irreducible thing which must not be changed for
transgender people, yet it is fine to alter it for intersex people, because I
think of the assumption that intersex already represents a deviation from
God’s intention.
However, those who rail against transgender interventions because
they’re unnatural may not feel so exercised about organ transplants,
cochlear implants, laser eye surgery, prosthetic limbs, or a host of the
ways that we intervene to augment our bodies, perhaps because we tend
to understand sex and gender as somehow more fundamental than other
aspects of our bodilyness. Yet, as I’ve argued at length elsewhere, the
inconsistency in responses to transgender and to intersex suggests that
something more is going on.
While opponents to transgender intervention often hold that this
is because human embodiment and animality are irreducible and
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shouldn’t be eroded often because of a good Christian commitment to
concreteness, context, and incarnation, responses to intersex hints that
there is something else underlying appeals to bodily integrity, and that
bodies themselves may need to be brought into line with a more binary
gender than binary sexed assumption about what true divinely intended
human life actually looks like. But if binary gender is grounded in
binary sex, what’s the rationale for arguing that even people who do
not have a clear binary sex must also have a clear binary gender?
Significantly though it’s not just critics of transgender who appeal to
givenness.
Many transgender people themselves also appeal to givenness, but
in this case the irreducibility of their gender identity which they too
often understand as divinely ordained. Several transgender Christians
including clergy, names such as Carol Stone, Rachel Mann, Sarah Jones,
Justin Tannis, have written and spoken of the deep and intertwined
relationship between their vocation to ordained ministry and their
calling to live their lives in the gender they’ve always understood
themselves to be.
So Tanis for example says, “I look at my experiences of gender as the
following of an invitation of God to participate in a new, whole, and
healthy way of living in the world – a holy invitation to set out on
a journey of transformation of body, mind, and spirit.” Tanis writes
powerfully of his understanding of gender as calling, not just for
transgender people but for everyone, and he notes that in common with
other vocations it may be revealed all at once or gradually over a long
period.
Rachel Mann acknowledges that her transition was, and I’m quoting her
directly, an act of violence against the normal course of things, and yet
she says “Without it I would not have achieved the degree and depth of
self-reconciliation that I have.”
Another theologian writing about transgender, Tricia Sheffield, has
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argued that Christ’s body as constructed in Calcedonian belief is
somehow trans. It’s simultaneously human and divine, and therefore
it’s polymorphous and transmutative with both natures preserved. Since
Christians believe in this body of Christ as well as helping to constitute
it, Christ’s body might be a particularly important sight of solidarity and
hope for transgender people.
Now the work of some recent Christian writers, particularly
evangelicals in response to transgender including Mark Yarhouse,
Andrew Walker that I’ve already mentioned, may just on gender
dysphoria, that is the sense of alienation and exclusion from their bodies
that many transgender people feel, and as a result these theorists argue
that the most therapeutic option for those transgender people will be
to come to feel reconciled to their bodies but without any surgical or
hormonal intervention. There’s thus far been less acknowledgement
from that branch of the church that peace and reconciliation may
come about through and not despite gender transition, and the broader
recognition of one’s identity by others including one’s faith community.
So why spiritual care for transgender people? Well pastoral and spiritual
care for trans people might usefully be understood as accompaniment
across all stages of their lives before transition, during, and after any
public gender transition. Such spiritual care might be an easy sell to
those of us already invested in the place of faith and the supernatural in
everyday life. However, in discussions about what should or could be
provided by stretched healthcare systems, this aspect of the common
good is not taken for granted. In a context like Britain where more and
more people identify as having no religion, it may seem like a niche
interest for an already stretched health service.
But more broadly, spirituality is understood as referring to the whole
person, the package of their physical, emotional, mental, social wellbeing, particularly perhaps in the sense of belonging to something
larger than that which we encounter in everyday life, and that could go
regardless of whether or not someone adheres to a particular religious
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tradition. So if we’re interested in negotiating goods and weighing
up what constitutes the common good, we’ll be interested both in
what’s good for communities as well as individuals, but also in what
is commonly good for the different elements making up any given
individual.
So we might say giving space to spirituality in healthcare is giving
space to acknowledgment that the person is a whole person, lives in a
community network, and is more than the sum of their body parts. And
I could point you to a host of research on healthcare chaplaincy which
demonstrates the importance of spiritual well-being for mental and
physical health.
Theologians including John Swinton have emphasized the importance
of emotion, feeling, intuition, and a sense of something beyond essential
to processes of care, and have noted that a person’s wider social and
semantic context is not simply a backdrop to the real task of dealing
with biological and psychological events which may be deemed
pathological.
Now good healthcare providers know this. They know it already and
they do all they can to promote holistic well-being, but even the best
as we’ve heard are working within overstretched systems and may find
they simply have less time and fewer resources than they would like.
The goes particularly in the UK context for those working in gender
medicine. The NHS mandates a maximum 18-week waiting time for
access to interventions, and yet the numbers of trans people being
referred have spiraled so much in the last few years that the waiting list
is now over two years in place.
But anecdotal evidence suggests that a significant proportion of people
seeking gender reassignment within the NHS in England do have a
personal faith, and that their faith and spirituality are impacted by
their gender incongruence and transition, and indeed this has been
corroborated by recent testimonies, for example those of members of
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Cybil’s transgender spirituality group who contributed to the collection
This Is My Body which came out a couple of years ago, or those of the
Anglican priest and poet Rachel Mann who I’ve already mentioned,
who reflects profoundly on the interactions between her vocation to
priesthood, herself understanding as transgender, and her complicated
relationship with a body which is subject to illness and pain as a result
of digestive disorders that she has.
Now this may largely relate to factors external to the affected individual
but might also for some people be a feature of minority stress and
in particular internalized transphobia. However, for many people
spirituality and faith are important sources of support and identity as
they undergo medical interventions and experience challenging life
changes. However, some trans people have found it difficult to find
religious communities where they can receive the support they need.
Sometimes that’s because of a suspicion within faith communities that
transgender identity is either a rejection of a divine plan or simply
evidence that something has gone wrong somewhere along the line,
and such responses which are often compassionate but nonetheless
characterized by a deep investment in the fixity of human sex and
gender underline work by Yarhouse, Walker, and Roberts which I’ve
already mentioned. So they aim to protect trans people’s families and
communities, and they might therefore be said to uphold a common
good, but I fear that it’s one which subsumes the good of the trans
minority to the apparent good of the majority.
And those both risks making trans people a kind of sacrificial scapegoat
who must be sacrificed to shore up a shaky system, and I think does too
little to interrogate whether a strongly binary system is actually bad for
others, not just for trans people. Sometimes it takes an uncommon need
for us to reevaluate our assumptions about what constitutes a common
good. And sadly, religious communities have not always endorsed trans
people’s sense of being accepted as effectively as they might’ve done,
and I want to suggest that this impoverishes these faith communities
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too.
For many trans people a key to good care is being encountered at all
junctures as a whole person, not a set of hormones and body parts.
Awareness of spirituality is awareness of this sense of personhood more
broadly, awareness of a sense of future, and for many people awareness
of being part of a universal community. And it’s for this reason that
in partnership with an NHS gender clinic in England I’m currently
formulating a framework for spiritual care for people undergoing gender
transition that aims to understand the implications of spiritual care
for broader mental and physical well-being, and which understands
as individuals existing in community and developing character in
community.
But a brief interlude. Some of you have been in classes this quarter
whose theme is gender justice and the common good, and I met some
of you in classes this morning. And as you might know, there was some
opposition to the invitation issue to me to come and speak as part of this
series, and in part that was because of work I’ve done in the past which
detractors felt was blasphemous and undermined the family, and because
I’m openly supportive of transgender people. but I wonder too whether
the title raised red flags for some people, “Gendered Theologies and the
Common Good”, because the term “gender” far from being neutral has
become enormously freighted within Roman Catholic circles particularly
in Europe.
A recent special issue of the journal Religion and Gender focused on
this controversy. Contributors pointed out that for the Vatican, appeals
to gender and engagement with critical gender theory are assumed to
go hand-in-hand with critiques of the assumption that binary human
sex is natural and universal. Mary and Kate writing in that special issue
holds that it was feminist discussions of gender in the 20th century
which prompted the development of the notion of complementarity
by Paul VI, John Paul II, and Benedict XVI, and she further argues
that complementarity then came to underlie the Vatican’s theology and
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ideology of human sex and sexuality not just in specifically religious
terms but also legally and politically as part of its ongoing opposition to
same-sex marriage.
So Case wants to argue that the Catholic authorities feared that
the gender agenda was motivated by a desire to deny the reality
and irreducibility of human sexness as male and female, and she
cites Benedict XVI’s appeal when he was _____ _____ against the
trivialization of sexual specificity that makes every role interchangeable
between man and woman. Sex no longer appears to be a determined
characteristic as a radical and pristine orientation of the person. This
was in opposition to radical feminists, but other contributors to the
special issue note that concern about the apparent undermining of
sexual essentialism also appears to underlie some Catholic authorities’
suspicion of transgender.
So taking all of that into account, in this climate the assumption might
be and clearly has been for some people that gendered theologies are of
necessity destructive ones, but I’m also interested in the broader title:
Gender Justice and the Common Good. Some of you in your classes and
broader work have been thinking about and reflecting on what is good
for all people and what promotes the kind of people and the kind of
culture and society you want to be.
There are some transgender people who would consciously align
themselves with queer theologies of the kind that have been suspicious
of the phenomenon of family values, not least because as commentators
like Mark Jordan and Lee Adelman have commented, appeals to
innocents such as children have too often been happy to throw real
children under the bus. That’s one tactic for rejecting the notion that
family can only be understood as a mother, a father, and their biological
children.
And in fact, one of the things that I do in my most recent book is to
explore the idea that actually the Christian tradition is replete with
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models of family and kinship that are far more diverse than that, and
there’s space within the tradition for exploring the ways in which
Christianity itself actually disrupts family and says that our commitment
is to not only our own group or our own tribe but to all children of God.
We all know perfectly well that families can be destructive as well as
affirming places, that they can harbor abuse and neglect, that children
are often more at risk from their own relatives than from strangers.
In his work on the common good and the social order, Gary Dorrien has
noted that appeals to a common good should not and cannot elide or
erase all difference. There will likely remain appeals to good which take
into account local circumstances and concepts, and this is appropriate.
However, acknowledging this diversity does not in itself do away with
any account of ethical normativity. It will still be possible to ask what
tends towards justice.
So when we explore the common good we need to ask whether appeals
only to binary models of sex and gender are really good for anyone
or for any of us. We need to ask whether the endorsement of bodily
materiality and specificity that underlines some rejections of the gender
agenda goes far enough, or whether in its conscious endorsement of
male and female it unconsciously excludes and pathologizes those
whose bodies and identities don’t fit either category.
This is particularly important given that variations from the statistical
norm include not only psychological and emotional but also physical
difference. And so in the next part of my lecture I want to move on to
thinking about the tricky business of what happens when goods seem to
collide, in this case in the care of intersex children.
Many parents have to make decisions about their children’s medical
care and healthcare when children are too young to give consent for
themselves. Parents who don’t consider themselves in any way experts
on medical matters are likely to defer to the judgment of professionals
involved with their child’s care, especially in emergency situations
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where decisions have to be made quickly. But what happens when
there’s debate over the best path of care, when parental decisions have
implications for children’s well-being not just in the immediate future
but throughout their lives, when parents and doctors disagree about
care, or when in some situations parents are not the ones best placed to
agree to decisions on behalf of their children?
Questions like this are brought into particularly sharp focus in the area
of intersex, and for those of you not familiar with this terminology,
intersex refers to people who are born with atypicalities of their physical
sex such that their bodies can’t be classified as male or female. So their
genitals, their gonads, their chromosomes, hormones, gamits, may vary
from those we typically expect to find.
So for example, an intersex person may have an externally female
body. They may have a vulva, a clitoris, breasts after puberty, however
they would have internal testes and XY chromosomes rather than XX
chromosomes. That would be one example. Other intersex people might
have XX, that is female chromosomes, but a large clitoris which looks
and functions more like a penis. And some intersex people have a mix
of characteristics, some XX cells and some XY cells in the same body,
a testes and an ovary, genitalia which don’t really look either male or
female but something different.
Some people go through most or even all of their lives without ever
realizing for example that they’re genetic mosaics, that is that they have
a mix of XX and XY chromosomes or some female tissue alongside
their male tissue. This might begin to prompt questions for us about
how significant physical sex really is as a marker of identity and
ontology if it’s not uncommon not even to know about it and yet to live
a perfectly ordinary life.
But some differences are of course more evident from early on. When
infants are born with visibly unusual genital anatomy, parents are likely
to be asked to make decisions about their care soon after birth, and
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what’s best for intersex infants is hugely debated particularly given
criticisms since about the middle of the 1990s about early surgeries.
Intersex adults and allies have been battling against that since then.
Furthermore, decisions made by doctors or parents in the past might
be considered to have been detrimental to the long-term good of the
intersex adult.
So ethics in this area are about the difficult task of weighing up present
and projected goods and deciding which and whose goods should be
most closely guarded. Christian theological ethics and theological
anthropology contain rich and varied discussions surrounding the
moral and the cosmic significance of human sex differentiation. For
some commentators following in the footsteps of Thomas Aquinas for
example or Carl Bart or Hanses Von Balthazar, human sex relationship
is synectoky like a little mini version an example of the divine human
relationship, and something of the meaning of being human is found in
sex itself, particularly as this tends – for these writers it tends in male
terms – towards generativity, towards reproduction.
Bart argued that the way that human females were to follow and to
respond to human males echoed the way that all humans were to follow
and respond to God. To deny the order and procession built into human
sex and gender, Bart believed, would be to deny the broader divine
order. The problem with this is that it assumes a hierarchy of genders
simply is natural and indisputable rather than being a social construction
which presents its own problems and might actually prevent women
and people with unusual sex gender configurations from developing
relationships with God in their own right.
And in contrast I’ve wanted to suggest that while to be human is
irreducibly to be sexed, human sex does not manifest only along male or
female lines, and biological generativity is a frequent but not a universal
concomitant. Intersex people’s humanity is in no way compromised
because their sex is atypical. Rather, intersex is one phenomenon which
disrupts the apparent incontrovertibility of clear and binary biological
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sex as a human characteristic, and I’ve explored this at greater length in
two of my books as well as the new book I’ve already mentioned.
But another really useful text that I’ve put up here as well is Megan
Defranza’s book Sex Difference in Christian Theology: Male,
Female, and Intersex in the Image of God. Rooted in her evangelical
background, but targeted particularly at a Roman Catholic readership.
In the last two decades, many intersex activists and other commentators
have been vocally critical of the paradigm under which children with
atypical genitalia were likely to undergo early corrective surgery such
as the reduction of a large clitoris, the removal of a small penis, or the
creation of a vaginal opening.
Critics of the early corrective surgery model have argued that unusual
genitals are almost never in themselves of any detriment to physical
health and that there’s no need to perform surgery in infancy or
childhood, and those familiar with this area of ethics will know that
at its very heart are tussles over competing goods and questions
about whether justice for society at large is best served by early and
compulsory medical intervention for children with unusual bodies.
Intersex activists and critical theorists have argued that actually secrecy
and misinformation surrounding the medical treatment of intersex
have been as harmful if not more harmful than unusual physical
manifestations have been.
And from the mainstream medical side I think another set of goods
has been at stake, that is around intervening to promote normality, the
assumption that children need to be clearly sexed and appropriately
gendered in order to be happy and normal, and perhaps a suggestion
implicit rather than explicit that’s allowing unusually sexed bodies to
persist uncorrected is in some way threatening to the good of society
at large. Many doctors today still believe that to be happy and welladjusted someone must be clearly male or female, and that if there’s
any question about sex it’s appropriate to tweak the body for the sake of
future gender identity.
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Doctors aren’t unique in that respect. We can see similar assumptions
in the work of writers like Yarhouse and Roberts as well as O’Donovan
and others. Furthermore, many parents also assume that clear sex
is a prerequisite of the normality they want for their children. But
increasingly as we’ve heard, commentators suggest that risks to
psychological well-being with atypical anatomy may cause have
been overstated and that what’s more psychologically damaging
is undergoing invasive genital surgery, frequent examination and
hospitalization, not being told the truth about one’s condition, and
growing up in a climate of secrecy.
Now doctors who do intervene appeal to a range of goods to justify
their intervention. Many continue to believe that early surgery promotes
better psychological outcomes later; others also believe it’s necessary
for parents to see normal-looking genitals in order to be able to
bring up their child without ambivalence. Parental desires for normal
children stem I think not from selfishness but from a sincere belief that
difference and abnormality often lead to suffering and bullying and are
best avoided. Parents are aware that they’re not bringing children up in
a vacuum, and that not being readily identifiable as a boy or a girl is one
of the first things that might make their children vulnerable.
What else are they to do but to make decisions which seem as though
they’ll promote happiness and normality for their child? But even when
they’re working with a wide range of information, parents my privilege
more pressing or immediate goods over more distant or nebulous ones.
This is not particularly surprising or sinister. After all, not all parents are
conversant with the critical gender theory that’s been so prevalent in the
intersex discussion.
They may not be aware that early surgery is being criticized from
so many quarters. They might be ashamed or embarrassed or just
bewildered at being told by doctors that they’re not sure about their
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baby’s sex. They may feel squeamish thinking about their baby’s future
sex life. They’ll also have other concerns in mind. What might happen
to them as a family if their child’s unusual body goes uncorrected, or if
they don’t conceal the uncertainty surrounding their child’s sex?
In short, parents are likely to make choices which they believe will
promote their child’s happiness, but the existence of the strongly binary
gendered paradigm that we have in Western societies influenced by
Christian theological goods and norms means that few parents are
confident enough to believe that growing up with atypical genitalia or
perhaps a non-binary gender identity could promote happiness. Eva
Fada-Kutay has argued that a purported desire for normality by parents
is actually shorthand for a desire for other goods: safety, comfort,
stability.
Normality equals desirability. It’s a communal good rather than an
individual one. Significantly however, what is considered normal is
not fixed. It’s likely to shift and alter as social morays do. Additionally
communal goods and individual goods will not always be identical.
Kutay argues that excessive conformity is morally repugnant and gives
rise to blandness for those who remain within the norm and isolation for
those excluded.
So one tactic for those parents who face having abnormal children,
including parents of intersex children, will be to construct new
normalities based for example on seeking out other families in similar
situations. Importantly in this way they don’t reject the concept of
normality altogether. Indeed they affirm that it’s appropriate and good
for normal parents to create safe and supportive environments for their
children. But, says Kutay, what they affirm is an altered conception of
the norm.
The new norms are generated out of a newly constituted habitus, one
that emerges under changed conditions of existence and through the
formation of a different community. The new community is not distinct
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from the old, nor are its conditions of existence entirely different. There
are continuities and discontinuities. So Christian communities I want
to say might also be instrumental in promoting new conceptions of
belonging and legitimacy which don’t rest only in binary sex norms,
particularly given the tradition’s long history of endorsing non-kinship
relationships, households, and other communities.
One of the things I explore in my new book is the idea that there will be
flashes of affinity between the family values claimed as such and those
which embrace more expansive modes, including perhaps same-sex
marriage, and that there will be both continuity and discontinuity with
more familiar versions of institutions like marriage and family.
So one question could be whether and when the goods of promoting
family goals might be preferred over goods merely belonging to
individual children. Could a family’s need for normality and avoiding
unwelcome attention override an intersex child’s good in having
their bodily integrity respected? And the broadest possible range of
adult sexual outcomes kept open for them. What family goods might
Christian theologians want to claim where the family is the religious
community in which the child is growing up as well as the immediate
biological family, or whether moral community can be understood even
more broadly as society at large.
As Russ notes, respecting persons includes respecting their
potential goods as well as their actual ones. I want to suggest that
eschatologically inflected ethics in the context of decision-making
on ethical care for intersex infants will mean that future goods are
considered alongside present ones. If human goods are constructed
as those which anticipate and inaugurate an order beyond binaries,
and which recognize the importance of provisionality in resisting the
maximization of human ideology, then decision-making for intersex and
for broader questions of care will acknowledge person’s future existence
in the incoming order, not just their existence within the present one.

Taking future goods seriously will usually mean making choices
which least limit the future options for the child concerned. Now we
might immediately note there an area of tension between intersex and
transgender. After all, some interventions for transgender are also
serious and irreversible. Is it not hypocritical to hold that intersex
children should have their options kept open as possible if we don’t say
the same about transgender?
Well, a couple of responses to that. First as I’ve noted, most people who
transition gender and undergo gender confirmation surgery are already
well established in their adult lives, and I haven’t been talking and I’m
not at all talking today about the ethics of intervention for children with
a transgender identity. That is a whole conversation that we don’t have
time for today. Suffice to say that irreversible interventions for under
18’s remain extremely rare, and that medics tend precisely to advocate
delaying making permanent decisions for as long as possible. Young
trans people may be offered hormones to delay their puberty in order to
give them more time to come to understand the momentous nature of
some of their decisions.
Furthermore though, sadly it’s the case that not intervening for trans
people doesn’t always mean in practice more options for their future. In
fact, many trans people experience such distress and dysphoria that they
self-harm and even take their own lives such that their future in this
earthly realm at least is abruptly curtailed. It’s here that we do butt up
against a continuing area of tension between transgender and intersex.
It’s indisputable that at least some trans people do inhabit a strongly
binary mindset, not challenging the notion that there are men and
women and that they’re different from each other, but simply holding
that they should’ve been born the other one.
By contrast, intersex people and their advocates are far more likely to
challenge the binary system all told, holding that sex and gender are
more of a continuum than a binary. But in both cases from a theological
anthropological angle we might want to reflect on how our lives and
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bodies as we experience them here and now relate to our hope and
expectation of embodied lives in the age to come.
Yurgan Moltman, the Christian theologian working in Germany, holds
that there must be continuity and discontinuity between this age and
the age to come in terms of the relationships and social goods currently
in operation. The newness that comes about in the eschaton, he says,
makes the old order obsolete but not by annihilating it. Rather, he says,
it gathers it up and creates it a new. The eschaton completes the first
creation so that what is remembered is caught up and preserved in hope,
and what is past is surpassed in the future.
Similarly for Carl Bart, eschatology anticipates a resurrection in which
humans are raised as ourselves. So eschatology involves redemption,
not erasure of what is and has been. Where it’s been assumed that
deviation from binary male and female is deviation from a divine
creational norm, it may be assumed that such redemption would involve
healing intersex bodies, and that medical interventions in this life might
be considered in anticipation of such healing. There are theologians who
make exactly that argument.
But in the affirmation that what we see now is not all that is, we need
perhaps to reexamine assumptions about what makes good or healthy
bodies. Intervention to correct unusual sex may limit possibility not
just for this specific body but for human bodies in general. This is why
it’s so important that we’re beginning to hear from intersex adults, not
only about their critiques of early corrective surgery but also about their
experiences of spirituality and self-understanding of their bodies as
sights of divine revelation.
I’ve drawn on interviews with intersex Christians in some of my own
work who appeal for example to the belief that God made them and
wove them together in their mother’s womb, in the words of Psalm 139,
and felt that there must be a bigger purpose, that this was happening
within God’s plan and God’s intention. Spiritual care for this population
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means taking seriously these body stories without dismissing them
as more fallen or further from God’s intention than others, but there
continue to exist accounts which call this into question and hold that
intersex somehow contradicts the orders of creation.
Several intersex Christians from whom I’ve heard in the last few
weeks are deeply dismayed by the Council for Biblical Manhood and
Womanhood’s Nashville statement on human sex, gender, and sexuality.
Since while at first sight this appears to acknowledge the existence of
intersex in non-condemnatory fashion, reading between the lines it
actually appears to do the opposite and to mandate surgical intervention
to clarify binary sex.
So in the context of decision-making about intersex infants’ care and
promotion of the common good, an important question is what kind
of persons the community wishes to cultivate. What are the virtues
and qualities the Christian community wishes doctors, parents, and
we ourselves, whether we’re intersex people or others invested in
promoting intersex goods to have? How might such virtues be endorsed
or elighted in giving care pathways including spiritual care? What are
the family goods of the Christian Church?
For many Christian ethicists, wisdom and virtue have been understood
as participation in bringing about God’s new order. Christians might
judiciously be circumspect about assuming that the fulfillment of
a divine intent for human sex in creation necessarily entails the
endorsement and maintenance only of binary sex and gender as goods.
If inaugurated eschatology entails the in-breaking of the world to
come, living prophetically may mean challenging the order of things.
These principles chime with more mainstream accounts of the new
creation, for John Zazulas for example eschatology profoundly entails
reconciliation, and the activity of the Church on earth are four tastes of
it.
The Church may be figured then as a place where reconciliation is
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imagined and difference celebrated. Reconciliation will not necessarily
mean erasure of difference, but as in theologies of disability,
transformation of its significance. Zazulas describes the communion of
all things overcoming our presently mutually antagonistic communions.
If virtue is the education of character and community, then for the
Church. Eucharist is a mean by which this occurs.
Christians are schooled in the necessity of the acknowledgement of
the equality of embodied experience before God. If our scatological
resurrection bodies are not necessarily figured as binary sexed, then
removing uncertainty and constructing assemblance of binary sex now
need not be the best or only way to inscribe legitimacy in the just future
we’re helping to build.
The account with which I opened, that of the vision of the NHS at its
construction is one powerful account, but as I said not an unchallenged
one, and one which raises as many questions as answers about the
necessary bounds of the community, and that tension is repeated in
dilemmas about how to squeeze good spiritual care into a creaking
system and how to negotiate whose goods are paramount.
Yet as Gary Dorrien notes, recognizing conflicting and competing
accounts doesn’t mean giving up on the possibility of a just common
future. We can appeal to a common good because we are of a common
kind. We are of the same genus. We are all human kin. We share the
same genre, yet genre can be limiting as well as democratizing. It can
be genericizing. It can be stultifying, and it’s here I begin the discussion
in my new book, holding that each new human is both entirely a
product of their culture and history and entirely something new with the
potential to generate.
For this reason as humans we’re not condemned to repeat or reinforce
what’s been passed down to us. We shape it just as it has shaped us.
Accounts of marriage, family, health, well-being, and the good, none of
these is immaculate or unchanging, rather they develop over time and in
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conversation with historic and contemporary traditions, and it’s in and
through mutual relationship between the people formed by institutions
and the institutions formed by people that Christians create and recreate
their faith.
So one of the things we’ve considered today as I draw to a close is that
sex and gender don’t always seem to match in typical ways even at a
biological level. Transgender and intersex show that sex and gender
may not always be as straightforward as they seem. Should they then be
understood as anomalies which don’t fundamentally disrupt the model
of there being two distinct and separate human genders which map on to
two distinct and separate human sexes as God intended, or alternatively
should the existence of transgender and intersex prompt theologians to
reexamine their theological anthropologies and ask whether theologies
which assume a fixed binary model of maleness and femaleness
continue to make sense in light of what we now know of human sex and
gender.
Theologies which assume maleness and femaleness can’t easily
accommodate hard cases, but if intersex and transgender are not
just exceptions to the rule but actually mean that Christians should
reexamine their whole understanding of sex and gender, asking what
constitutes a common good, that is good for these embodied, divinely
made, and God-imaging people too, will be central to our project.
While heterosexual norms might have been convenient bedfellows for
Christianity at certain places and times in its history, its conflation with
them must be resisted. Only by retelling and reclaiming lost stories
about multiple genders, identities, bodies and lives, can God’s own lack
of anexability be emphasized. Thank you very much.
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